A CRITICAL SURVEY OF CERTAIN PHASES OF TRIAL
PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES.*
VI. SWEARING THE JURY.
At common law the oath administered to petit jurors in
felony cases was as follows:
"You shall well and truly try and true deliverance make
between our sovereign lord the King, and the prisoner at the bar,
whom you shall have in charge, and true verdict give according
to the evidence, so help you God."
In misdemeanors the form was slightly different:
"You shall well and truly try the issue joined between our
sovereign lord the King and the defendant and true verdict give
according to the evidence, so help you God."
In this country there are statutes in many of the States prescribing the form of oath that is to be administered; in others,
the common law forms have been adhered to in the absence of
legislative enactment. In a few States a more formal oath is
required in capital than in non-capital cases, the two forms being practically equivalent to the common law oaths noted
above.1 39 But most of the States have provided by statute that
a single form of oath designated shall apply to all criminal
cases. These vary in length and solemnity from that of Connecticut:
"You do solemnly swear by the name of the ever-living God,
that without respect of persons or favor of any man, you will
well and truly try and true deliverance make between the State
of Connecticut and the prisoner at the bar whom you shall have
in charge, according to the law and the evidence before you; so
help you God."'"4
to the comparatively simple statute in Wisconsin:
"You shall well and truly try the issue between the state of
Wisconsin and the defendant according to the evidence, so help
you God."''
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It is usually provided that any juror who is conscientiously
scrupulous of taking the oath prescribed shall be allowed to
make affirmation, substituting the words "this you do tinder the
pains and penalties of perjury" for "so help you God."
Under our judicial system, the administration of an oath to
the jury is considered an essential feature of "trial by jury." A
failure to swear the jury is fatal to a conviction and necessitates a reversal of the case. 1 42 While there is little authority
upon the subject, it is usually said that swearing the jurors for
the term is insufficient in criminal prosecutions; they must be
sworn to try the particular case. The reasons are given in
143
Barney v. People:
"With some jurors and in some cases too much solemnity
cannot be observed in the conduct of the trial. The solemnity
of calling the juror before the prisoner, in the presence of the
court and his there taking the solemn oath prescribed by the law,
to well and truly try and true deliverance make of that prisoner, not only gives the prisoner a comfortable assurance that he
is to have a fair and impartial trial, but has a salutary tendency
to prepare the mind of the juror for the solemn duty he is assuming. We think the jury should be sworn in each case."
It is usually held that the oath must be administered in the
statutory language; but by statute in Arkansas it is sufficient if
the jury be sworn substantially as provided by law,14 4 and there
is authority, in the absence of an express statute, to the effect
that a substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required.1 4' This is certainly the more sensible rule.
It has been said in many cases, though usually by way of
dictum, that if the record show merely that the jury were
"sworn" or "duly sworn" or "sworn according to law," it will
be presumed that the oath was properly administered.Y40 Where
",1
Stevens v. State, 25 S.W. Rep. 286 (Tex. 1894); Slaughter v. State,
ioo Ga. 323 (1897).
"22 Ill.
i6o.
'"Arkansas, Digest of Statutes, §2373."
"Young v. Commonwealth, i9 Ky. L. Rep. 929 (1897); Lancaster v.
State, 91 Tenn. 267 (I891).
I" Lawrence v. Commonwealtl, 30 Grat. 845 (Va. 1878) ; Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U. S.52 (1889) ; Holland v. State, 14 Tex. Ap. 182 (1883); State v.
Ice, 34 W. Va. 244 (i89o).
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the record says more, as that the jury were "sworn to try the
issue joined between the parties," but does not quote the required
oath verbatim, there is a difference of opinion as to whether the
oath will be presumed to have been regularly administered. It
is held on one hand that such an incomplete recital is to be regarded merely as a statement that the jury were sworn according
to law, and it will therefore be presuned that the proper oath
was administered. 4 7 In Garner v. State,1 4 a capital case, the
record recital was that the jurors "were duly selected, chosen,
empaneled, and sworn to try the issues joined." The following
oath was provided by statute:
"You shall well and truly try and true deliverance make,
between the State of Florida and the prisoner at the bar, whom
you shall have in charge, so help you God."
It was held:
"The record entry is not intended to show how the jurors
were sworn, but merely to show that they were actually sworn,
and the presumption is that the swearing was legally done, unless
the record shows the contrary and overcomes the presumption."
The other view is that such a recital is to be regarded as an
attempt to declare the oath actually administered; under this
view, since the record does not recite the statutory oath exactly,
it is presumed that the oath was not properly administered and
150
9
a reversal follows. 14 This was the result in Johnson v. State,

where the record stated that the jury "were duly sworn to well
and truly try the issue joined between the State of Alabama and
the defendant, Joe Johnson." It was held:
"If it were stated that the jury were duly sworn according
to law, it might perhaps be presumed that they were sworn in
the form required by the statute. The oath stated leaves out
an essential part of the oath: 'and a true verdict render accord"*Baldwinv. Kansas, 129 U. S. 52 (1889); Brown v. Commonwealth,
86 Va. 466 (i8go) ; Boose v. State, io Ohio St. 467 (1855) ; State v. Ice, 34
W. Va. 244 (89o).
28 Fla. 113 (I89).
Patterson v. State, 7 Ark. 59 (1846) ; Tompkin v. State, 4 Tex. Ap. z59
(1878); Schamberger v. State, 68 Ala. 543 (88i).
147 Ala. 9 (1872).
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ing to the evidence, so help you God.' Not only an essential,
but the most impressive part of the oath was omitted and the
judgment must be reversed."
Again, while it was said in dictum in Harrimanv. State,' '
that if the record were wholly silent as to whether an oath had
been administered to the jury it would be presumed that they
had taken the legal oath, the cases are mostly to the opposite
effect. It is rather generally held that a conviction will be reversed where the record does not affirmatively show that the
15 2
jury were sworn.
It is submitted that there might well be legislation upon this
subject, and that a suitable statute might possess the following
characteristics: a simple form of oath is desirable, applicable to
all criminal cases-that prescribed in Wisconsin, and quoted
above, is perhaps as good as any that might be framed; it should
be provided that the administration of the oath would be sufficient if substantially in the statutory form, though not exactly in
the form prescribed; and there should be a presumption that the
oath was properly administered unless the contrary appear of
record. Under such a statute, a record wholly silent as to
whether or not the jury were sworn, or one containing an incomplete recital of the oath would have the benefit of the presumption and would be held sufficient.
VII.

VIEW BY THE JURY.

At early common law a view by the jury was not permitted
in criminal cases; later it was allowed with the consent of both
parties, but not otherwise. In England at the present time it
appears that the granting of a view is in the discretion of the
trial court and does not depend upon consent. In this country,
most of the States provide by statute for a view in criminal
The
trials. These statutes vary widely in length and detail.
270 (Ia. 1849).
v. State, 2 Tex. 28o (1848); State v. Phillips, 28 La. An. 387;
State v. Randolph, 139 Mo. Ap. 311 (igog); Barbour v. State, 37 Ark. 6i
" 2

Greene,

" Nels

(i88i).
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Florida statute 5 3 provides simply that "the court may order a
view by the jury," giving no details as to the procedure. The
Rhode Island statute 5 4 also omits details and provides that "the
court shall regulate the proceedings and in its discretion accompany the jury." In Indiana' 55 the consent of both parties is necessary.

Montana'

66

requires the presence of the defendant and

his counsel. In Kentucky' 7 the judge, prisoner and counsel for
each side must accompany the jury. In West Virginia"" in
felony cases, judge, clerk and defendant are required to go with
the jury. The Mississippi act' 5 9 is the most elaborate of all; by
its provisions, the "whole organized court, consisting of the
judge, jury, clerk, sheriff, and the necessary number of deputy
sheriffs" proceed to the view; the accused must be present; the
court for all purposes remains in session during the absence from
the courtroom.
The usual statutory provision on this subject, however, is
exactly like, or very similar to Section iII of the California
Penal Code:
"When in the opinion of the court, it is proper that the jury
should view the place in which the offense is charged to have
been committed, or in which any other material fact occurred,
it may order the jury to be conducted in a body, in the custody
of the sheriff, to the place, which must be shown to them by a
person appointed by the court for that purpose; and the sheriff
must be sworn to suffer no person to speak or communicate with
the jury, nor to do so himself, on any subject connected with the
trial, and to return them into court without unnecessary delay
or at a specified time."
The typical American statute provides merely for a view of
the "place" in which the offense is charged to have been committed or some material fact occurred; a view of persons or of
'"Gen. Stats. i9o6, §3989. Similiarly, Minnesota, Revised Laws, x9o5,
§5362; Washington, Code, 1910, §216o; Wisconsin, Statutes, 19H, §4694;
Maine, Revised Statutes, 19o3, §97r.
"5 Statutes, p. ioa6.
'"Annotated Statutes, I9O8, §2140.
' Revised Statutes, i9o6, Vol. III, §958.
..Criminal Code of Practice, §236.
*"Code, i9o6, §3730.

Code, i9O6,

§2720.
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personal property is not specifically contemplated. Under the
very general language of the Florida statute quoted supra, it
10 0
but
has been held that a view of personal property is proper,
simply
providing
subject
this
upon
statutes
the
of
under most
for a view of the place, it is usually held that a view of person6
alty is improper. In People v. Fagan,' ' during a trial for larceny of cattle, the jury were permitted to view three head of
cattle at the corral of one Young, for the purpose of comparing
the marks of those cattle with the marks upon a hide that was
offered in evidence. The court held the proceeding improper,
l 2
the
as the statute only authorized views of places. In Canada
. .
.
justice
of
ends
the
for
court "may, if it appears expedient
direct that the jury shall have a view of any place, thing or person." The advisability of a statute of this sort suggests itself,
in view of the fact that a view of personal property, or even of a
person, that cannot easily be brought into court, may often help
the jury to a better understanding of the case.
While it is usual to administer an oath to the officer who has
been directed to conduct the jury to the place to be viewed, not
to communicate with the jury or to suffer other persons to do so,
and to return the jury into court promptly, it is held, in New
York, that a failure to administer this oath, where the jury are
placed in charge of a sworn officer of the court, is an irregularity merely, and that it does not require or justify a new trial,
unless there is some opportunity to conclude that the defendant
was prejudiced.' 6
It is believed to be the rule everywhere that the granting of
a view is a matter entirely within the discretion of the trial
court. This is as it should be; if, therefore, a view be asked by
either party and refused, this refusal will not be reviewed by
the appellate court, 64unless, perhaps, there has been an obvious
abuse of discretion.1
State, 47 Fla. 75 (19o4).
(Cal. 1893). Accord: State v. Landry, 29 Mont. 218 (1993).
X1 Revised Statutes, 19o6, Vol. III, §958.
" People v. Johnson, 46 Hun, 669 (N. Y. 1887).
' State v. Hunter, 18 Wash. 671 (1898); People v. White, 116 Cal. 17
kI897); People v. Buddensieck, lO3 N. Y. 487 (1886); Commonwealth - v.
11 O'Berry v.
ia33 Pac. 846
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It is error to grant a view of the place where the offence
is charged to have been committed, when there has been a material change in its condition, unless the place can be and is in
fact restored to its former condition for the purpose of the view.
In State v. Knapp6 5 the defendant moved for a view of the
premises, which was granted by the court. It was claimed
afterward that the condition of the premises had been changed
by replacing the top board of a fence which was off when the
offense was committed. The effect of the change was that while
at the time to which their testimony related, witnesses could
distinctly see a man at the door of the house, yet by replacing the
board in question the view of that door was wholly obstructed,
and thereby the jury were misled, and induced to discredit entirely the testimony of these witnesses upon a point material to
the defense. The court granted a new trial because of the
probability of injury to the accused.
The view must be properly conducted; the court should see
to it that the jury are kept together on their way to, on their
return from, and in their view of the premises, under the supervision of an officer, so that no person may communicate with
them or express any opinion or give any directions in their
hearing, and so that the jurors themselves can be guilty of no
misconduct likely to be prejudicial to the defendant. 16 6 But if
there are irregularities at the view, the party desiring to object
thereto must do so promptly; if he does not do so at the time,
nor upon the return of the jury into court, he is taken to have
waived his right of objection, and he may not for the first time
167
suggest the irregularities in the appellate court.
The courts do not agree as to whether the view is to be
. regarded as part of the trial; some hold that it is part of the trial,
as the jury during the view are receiving evidence; they receive
evidence, it is said, through the sense of sight, from the mute,
Miller, 139 Pa. 77 (i8go); Commonwealth v. Chance, i74 Mass. 245 (1899);
Young v. Commonwealth, 41 Ky. 7o8 (I9i).

1345 N. H. 148, 157 (1863).
People v. Hull, 86 Mich. 449 (i8gi).

187 People v. Fitzgerald, 137 Cal. 546 (9o2)
331 (1894).

; Jones v. State, 51 Ohio St.
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inanimate objects which come under their observation, and as
the defendant has a right to be 'confronted with the witnesses
against him, he has a right to be present at the view. 168 It is submitted that the more logical attitude is that the view is not part
of the trial. It is had away from the courtroom during a temporary adjournment of the court for the purpose. The judge
and other officers of the court in most States do not attend. The
testimony of witnesses is not received; receiving impressions
from visible objects should be regarded not as the reception of
evidence, but as a means of enabling the jury to understand and
apply the evidence placed before them in open court.
Some
courts have agreed that the view is not part of the trial. 6 9 In
Ohio the courts have refused to decide whether the view is or
is not a part of the trial, but have held very slight conduct on the
part of the accused a waiver of the right, if there be such right,
70
to be present at the view.1
Whether the view be regarded as part of the trial or not, it
is believed that there are no jurisdictions in which it has been
said, in the absence of a statute requiring his presence 17 1 that the
defendant may not waive whatever right he has to be present.
An express waiver of the right is of course effective.'17 2 But the
accused may also waive the right by voluntary absence,
by refusing to attend the view (really a voluntary absence),
or by failing to request that he be permitted to be present. In
People v. Matthews 73 the defendant left the courtroom with the
jury, who were proceeding to view the premises, and went with
'" State v. Bertin, 24 La. An. 46 (1872); Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 3r
(1876) ; People v. Jones, ii Pac. Rep. 5oi (Cal. i886) ; People v. Bush, 68
Cal. 623 (i886) ; Foster v. State, 70 Miss. 755 (1893).

People v. Bonney, i9 Cal 427 (i86I), (Reversed by later California
cases, see infra, note i8o) ; People v. Thorn, 156 N. Y. 286 (i898) ; State v.
Lee Doon, 7 Wash. 3o8 (1893) ; State v. Mortenson, 26 Utah, 312 (1903). And
see Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 289 (1885).
"' Reighard v. State, 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 340 (igoi); Blythe v. State, 47
Ohio St. 234 (890).

" Such statutes are found in Montana, Revised Codes, 1907, §9298;
Kentucky, Crim. Code Practice, §236; West Virginia, Code, 1906, §3730;
Mississippi, Code, i9o6, §2720.
1"2State v. Sasse, 72 Wis. 3 (1888) ; People v. Thorn, i56 N. Y. 286 (i898).
1' 139 Cal. 527 (igo3). Accord: State v. Mortenson, 26 Utah, 312 (19o3).
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them to the foot of the stairs, but gave as his reason for not
going farther that he knew the premises very well. It was held:
"It would be a dangerous rule to hold that the mere absence
of the defendant of his own accord during the examination of
the premises by the jury would be ground for a new trial. Such
a rule would offer an opportunity to a defendant out on bail in
every case by some contrivance to absent himself for a few
moments, and after a verdict against him for the first time to
have such fact presented as a ground for a new trial."
In Blvthe v. State1 74 the court gave the defendant permission to
accompany the jury at the view, if he desired to do so, but he,
by the advice of counsel, declined to go with them. It was held:
"As the court expressly granted to the defendant permission to accompany the jury when the view was taken, which
privilege, under advice of counsel he declined to accept, he must
be deemed to have voluntarily absented himself, and thereby
waived his right and privilege to be present when the view was
taken."
In State v. Reed, 17 5 on request of the defendant, a view was had
of the premises, without any desire expressed on his part to be
present at such view; the court held that it was incumbent upon
him to make known his desire to be present, and by his failure to
do so, he must be taken to have waived any right, constitutional
or otherwise, he might have to be present. In Oklahoma the
curious view has been taken, that the defendant by requesting a
1 6
view thereby expressly waives his right to be present. 7
There is a difference of opinion as to the effect of an involuntary absence of the defendant from the view, depending, it
seems, upon whether or not the view be regarded as part of the
trial. In State v. Bertin17 7 the accused was refused permission
to attend a view by the jury; the court held this error on the
ground that the view was part of the trial, and if had in the ab2'47
Ohio St. 234 (898). Accord: State v. Congdon, 14 R. I. 458 (1884);
State v. Buzzell. qo N. H. 6s (870).
I'3 Idaho, 754 (1894). Accord: Shular v. State, 1O5 Ind. 289 (1885);
Reighard v. State, 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 340 (I9OI); State v. Hartley, 22 Nev.
342 (I895) ; State v. Adams, 2o Kan. 312 (1878).
ITS5
Okla. Cr. 44o (19).
11724 La. An. 46 (1872).
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sence of the defendant, the latter was being deprived of his constitutional right of confrontation. On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Van Horn178 the court declared themselves unable
to see in what manner the mere absence of the defendant at the
view worked a deprivation of any constitutional right, considering that no testimony was or could be taken during the view.
We have suggested that it is more logical to regard the view as
not being part of the trial; under this conception, an absence of
the defendant from the view, whether voluntary or involuntary,
should not be error, unless there be a statute expressly requiring
his presence.
In a few States it is provided by law that the judge shall be
present at the view ;179 in the absence of an express statutory
requirement, whether or not the judge must be present would
seem to depend upon whether the view be regarded as part of
the trial. So in California, though the statute does not require
the presence of the judge at the view, it has been held that he
must attend.' 80 In jurisdictions where the view is not regarded
as part of the trial, the absence of the judge therefrom is not
error."8 In the interest of the prompt administration of justice, the judge should not be required to abandon his other duties,
even temporarily, to be present at a view by the jury.
The reception of evidence at the view depends upon the
same considerations. If the view be regarded as part of the
trial, and judge and defendant are required to be present, evidence may also be received.' 8 2 In this connection the Mississippi statute,' 8 3 the substance of which we have already noted,
provides:
"The court on such occasion shall remain in session from
the time it leaves the courtroom till it returns thereto, and while
ITS
i8 Pa. 143 (i898).
" Kentucky, Code of Practice, §236; Mississippi, Code, i9o6,
West Virginia Code, i9o6, §3730.
' People v. Yut Ling, 74 Cal. 469 (i888).

"'State v. Adams,
(885).

' People v. Milner,

(1893).
Code, i9o6,

§2720.

20

Kan.

122

312

Cal. 17,

(1878); Shular v. State,

1O5

§272o;

Ind. 289

(I898); Foster v. State, 70 Miss. 755
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so in session outside the courtroom, it shall have full power to
compel the attendance of witnesses, to preserve order, to prevent
disturbance, and to punish for contempt, such as it has when
sitting in the courtroom. In criminal trials all such views or
inspections must be had before the whole court and in the presence of the accused, and the production of all evidence from all
witnesses or objects, animate or inanimate, must be in his
presence."
But there are numerous authorities to the effect that testi5
mony may not be taken at the view.1 84 In Hays v. Territory'"
the court sent the jury to view the place where the homicide was
alleged to have occurred, compelling the defendant to accompany
the jury, the judge and counsel for both sides, to the place. While
the jury viewed the premises, a witness gave testimony as to
the location of certain objects and the position of certain persons at the time of the homicide. The court held:
"By our statutes, no person can communicate with the jury
on any subject connected with the trial, while they are absent
from the courtroom, and a new trial may be had when the jury
has received any evidence out of court other than that resulting
from a view of the premises. In this case evidence was received
out of court. It is true the court and all of the court officers,
attorneys for both parties, and the defendant, were all present;
but we do not think that a session of the court can be legally held
in a country place, or on a public street. The object and purpose of permitting a jury to view the premises is to enable them
to better understand the evidence given upon the trial; and in
no case, so far as we have been able to learn, has it ever been
held that the court can take testimony before the jury while they
are viewing the premises."
Foster v. State 8 6 had been decided before this case. Under
our theory that the view should not be regarded as part of the
trial, witnesses should not be permitted to testify while the jury
are thus absent from the courtroom for the purpose of viewing
the scene of the crime.
No serious question has arisen in this country as to the
In
granting of a view in another county from that of trial.
M
Garcia v. State, 34 Fla. 311 (I894); State v. Miller, 61 Wash.
(xgIo); State v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 4o7 (i88o).
1'7 Okla. 15 (898).
11
Supra, note 182.
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England, it seems that a view may only be had in the county in
which the case is being tried,'8 7 but the rule here generally appears to be that the court may grant a view in any county of the
State. In Jones v. State lss the court said:
"The act does not limit the power to order a view to places
within the county; the words are broad enough to authorize a
jury to be sent anywhere, and no reason is apparent why a jury
might not be sent to any place where a material fact occurred,
if within the jurisdiction of the State."
As might be expected, there is a difference of opinion as to
whether, if the record do not show in detail the manner of conducting the view, the regularity of the proceedings will be presumed in the appellate court.1 s9 The better rule is that it will'be
presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that the
proceedings were regularly conducted.

VIII. JURORS TAKING NOTES DURING THE TRIAL.
In the codes of a number of States, in sections concerning
the papers that a jury may take with them on retiring to consider
their verdict, 9" 0 it is provided that the jurors may take to the
jury-room notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the
trial taken by themselves or any of them, but none taken by any
other person. 9 ' In general, however, and in the absence of
special statutory permission, the taking of notes has been
frowned upon. In Cheek v. State' 92 some of the reasons for this
position are given: the court said that the takinj of notes "was
well calculated to divert the attention of the jurors while they
were busy, pencil or pen in hand, from the evidence, as it would
naturally be progressing while such notes were being made. The
"'Laws

of England, Earl of H., Vol. 9, p. 369; Archbald, Criminal Evi-

dence, Pleading and Practice, 24th Edition, p. 224.
'"51 Ohio St. 331 (1894). Accord: People v. Bush, 71 Cal. 6o2 (1887).
'"Cf. Benton v. State, 3o Ark. 328 (1875), with People v. Hug, 72 Cal.
117 (887).
"' See page 768 of this article.

" 1 See for example: N. Y. Code Cr. Pro., §426; Cal. Penal Code, §1137;
Minnesota, Laws, 1905, §5367; Arizona, Crim. Code, 96o.
"35

Ind. 492 (1871).
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juror is to register the evidence, as it is given, on the tablets of
his memory and not otherwise. Then the faculty of the memory
is made, so far as the jury are concerned, the sole depository of
all the evidence that may be given, unless a different course be
consented to by the parties or the court. The jury should not
be allowed to take the evidence with them to their room except
in their memory. Jurors would be too apt to rely on what might
be imperfectly written, and thus make the case turn on a part
only of the evidence." Again, in United States v. Davis,"'3 it
is said:
"It gives the juror taking notes an undue influence in discussing the case, when he appeals to his notes to settle conflicts
of memory. Without corrupt purpose, his notes may be inaccurate or meager or careless and loosely deficient, partial and
altogether incomplete. With a corrupt purpose they may be
false in fact, and entered for the purpose of misleading or
deceiving his fellows, when he comes to appeal to them. There
is no protection against such dangers except to forego the practice."
But while the taking of notes by a juror may not be approved, obviously not every indiscretion of this sort should be
ground for a new trial. So it has been held that where the defendant does not object to the juror taking notes, a new trial will
194
be refused, as it is presumed to have been with his consent,
that a verdict will not be set aside unless defendant did not know
of the taking of notes ;95 that it must appear that defendant's
.attorneys, as well as the defendant, did not know of it, the defendant being bound by the knowledge and by the acts of his
attorneys. 196

It is believed that the jurors shofild be forbidden by statute
to take notes without the permission of the court and that the
granting or refusing of such permission should be in the discretion of the court; so the court should be able to suppress the takIO3 Fed. Rep. 457 (9oo).
Clark v. State, 4o Ind. 263 (1872).

'State v. Robinson, 117 Mo. 649 (1893).
Long v. State, 94 Ind. 481 (1884).
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ing of notes where that is deemed advisable, 19 7 or to permit notes
to be taken, as in case of amounts testified to by a witness. 198 If
a juror does in fact take notes without permission, whether or
not a new trial is to be granted should depend, not upon whether
the defendant objected, or whether he or his attorneys did or
did not know that notes were being taken, but upon whether the
defendant was prejudiced thereby. It has been held that while
the taking of notes is misconduct, if the defendant be not shown
to have been prejudiced, a new trial will be refused. So in State
v. Joseph,"' one of the jurors made a memorandum of the testimony of some of the witnesses and carried the same into the
jury-room with him. The juror testified that there were but
three or four lines on the back of an envelope; that he saw defendant's counsel looking at him while he wrote; another juror
told him he had better quit writing; he did so, and put the envelope in his pocket; he did not show the notes to the rest of the
jurors, and there being so little as to benefit himself not at all, he
tore it up. The court refused a new trial, holding:
'"It is impossible to conceive of any injury resulting from
so slight an indiscretion, or that an irregularity such as this
could have prejudicially influenced the jury or caused them any
bias in their deliberations."
IX.

WHAT THE JURY MAY TAKE WITH THEm ON REriRiNG.

At common law the jury were permitted to take with them
to the jury-room only papers under seal; in this country this
rule was recognized as late as 1849,200 but has long since been
abrogated. In many of the States what the jury may take with
them on retirement is a matter of practice wholly unregulated
by statute. In several it is provided by law that:
"Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take with them
all papers (except depositions) which have been received in evidence in the cause, or copies of such public records or private
documents given in evidence as ought not in the opinion of the
reUnited States v. Davis, IO3 Fed. Rep. 457 (I90o).
Thomas v. State, go Ga. 437 (I892).
145 La. An. 9Q3 (893). Accord: Batterson v. State, 63 Ind. 53i (1878);
Commonwealth v. Tucker, i8g Mass. 457 (905).
'"Findlay v. People, i Mich. 234 (1849).
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court to be taken from the. person having them in possession.
They may also take with them the written instructions given,
and notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial,
taken by themselves or any of them, but none taken by any
other person."2" 1
In Kentucky20 2 "Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may
take with them all papers and other things which have been re203
"the court
ceived as evidence in the cause." In New York
may permit the jury upon retiring for deliberation to take with
them any paper or article which has been received as evidence in
the cause, but only upon the consent of the defendant and counsel for the people."
It is very generally the rule that "papers received in evidence" may be taken out by the jury. By statute in a number 2of
rule, 0 4
jurisdictions, depositions are expressly excepted from the
and in the absence of any definite statutory provision on the
subject, the courts tend to exclude them. Depositions partake
of the nature of oral testimony which the jurors are to take
' 20 5
unless peraway with them "on the tablets of their memory,
haps the court has given permission for the taking of notes. If
depositions were permitted to be taken out by the jury, undue
weight might be given to them in comparison with other oral
testimony. In Jack v. Territory" the court said on this point:
"The introduction of a deposition into the jury-room which
is justly condemned by all the authorities would generally put
before the jury a mixture of competent and incompetent matters, between which they could not well discriminate; and would
give to one human utterance merely because it chanced to be
written down an undue prominence and effect over other equally
or more important or reliable human utterances which happened
to be oral."
-For example: California, Penal Code, 1909, §1137; Nevada, Revised
Laws, 1912, §72o6; Oregon, Lord's Laws, i910, §143; Montana, Revised Codes,
i9o7, §9313.
Criminal Code, Practice, §248.
mCode Crim. Proc. (Cook), §425; and see People v. Hughson, i54 N. Y.
'53 (897).
So statutes cited in note 201, supra.
Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492 (871).
Z'2
Wash. Ter. xo6 (882).
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Dying declarations have not been excepted from the general rule by statute, but where the question has arisen, it is held
error for dying declarations to be taken to the jury-room on the
ground that a dying declaration is so nearly a deposition, that all
the reasons which have been advanced in support of the view
that depositions should not be taken by a jury in their deliberations may well be invoked as reasons why dying declarations
20
should be withheld from them.

7

It has not been usual to provide by statute that exhibits received in evidence, other than papers, may be taken by the
jury. The New York and Kentucky statutes, quoted above, do
so provide. But in many states, the courts have permitted exhibits to be taken; so a plan and photographs, a bottle of liquor,
a revolver and the bullet taken from the brain of the deceased,
clothing worn by the deceased at the time of the homicide, an instrument alleged to have been forged, or ledgers and cash book
in an embezzlement case. 208 In Taylor v. Commonwealth2° '
cartridge hulls found at the scene of the homicide were introduced into evidence by the prosecution, and prisoner's Winchester rifle, with shells fired from it, during the trial was introduced
by him to show that the plunger struck the shells differently
from these introduced by the prosecution. The jury were permitted without objection to take the rifle and shells to their
room. The question being whether it was proper for the jurors
to take the rifle apart and examine the plunger and ascertain
that it had been recently tampered with and fixed so as to explode the cartridge differently from those put in evidence by
the prosecution, the court held that there was no impropriety in
this conduct.
In Washington the statute by its terms permits only "papers" to be taken by the jury. This has been so construed as to
mDunn v. People, 172 Ill. 582 (1898); State v. Moody, 18 Wash. 165
(1897).
m State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149 (19oo) ; State v. Olson, 95 Minn. 104 (1905);
McCoy v. People, 175 Ill. 224 (1898) ; Bell v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 436 (1893);
Harshaw v. State, 94 Ark. 343 (191o); Commonwealth v. Stanley, 19 Pa.
Super. Ct. 59 (1902).

=go Va. iog (1893).
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permit other exhibits received in evidence to be taken, such as
clothing or a bottle of whisky. 210 But in other States, under
such a statute, it has been held error to give the jury articles
which could not reasonably be included within the term "pa2 11
pers." This was the attitude of the court in State v. Crea,
where it was said that "if the legislature in passing the section in
question had intended to permit the jury to take all kinds of exhibits with them to the jury-room when considering of their
verdict it would have been an easy matter to have clearly expressed such intentions." We quite agree that a statute permitting only "papers" to be taken cannot logically be construed to
mean other exhibits, but suggest that statutes upon this subject
should be so framed as to permit not only papers, but also such
other exhibits as would be of assistance to the jury in arriving at
a verdict, to be taken with them upon retiring for deliberation.
Whether the jury may have a copy of the statutes of the
State would seem to depend upon whether in the particular jurisdiction they are judges of the law as well as the facts in criminal cases. In Mulreed v. State21 2 the court said:
"As the jury are authorized by our fundamental law, in
all criminal cases whatever to determine the law as well as the
facts, it could hardly be regarded as an available or reversible
error, if any error at all, for the trial court to permit the jury, in
any criminal cause, to read in their retirement the statute defining the offense for which the defendant is prosecuted in such
case."
213
where
The opposite view is represented by State v. Kimball,

the court held:
"It is the duty of the judge to give the principles of law
which he regards as applicable to the facts as the jury may find
them. And, if he omit to do this, so far as the parties may deem
important in view of the evidence, further instructions may be
demanded with propriety. But a party has not the right to
'Jack v. Territory, 2 Wash. Ter. ioI (1882); State v. Cushing, 14
Wash. 527 (8W6); State v. Webster, 21 Wash. 63 (I899).
= IoIda. 88 (I9o4); see also Hansing v. Territory, 4 Okla. 443 (1896).
2213
Ind. 62 (1886); see also Gandolfo v. State, ii Ohio St. 114 (86o),
and Edwards v. Territory, i Wash. Ter. x95 (1862).
2" 50 Me. 409 (1861) ; see also State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873).
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require the judge to furnish the statutes for the jury, and allow
them therefrom to ascertain the law, and judge of its applicability to the facts presented."
It was held in Florida in 1849 that the charge of the court
could not be sent to the jury, as this would be tantamount to recharging the jury at their room in the absence of the prisoner
and his counsel ;214 but even there that rule has since been
changed ;215 and indeed, it is quite generally held that the court
may permit the jury to take the written instructions. 2 16
Permitting the jury to take papers or other exhibits or the
charge of the court, or withholding them from the jury is usually said to be within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
the appellate court will grant a new trial only where there has
been an abuse of discretion. 217 In Tennessee, however, a
statute provides that the charge shall be written, and "the jury
shall take it out with them upon their retirement." Under such
and it is error
a statute, the court, of course, has no discretion,
2 18
for it to fail to require the charge to be taken.
We have found the usual rule to be that the court may permit "papers or other exhibits received in evidence" to go to the
jury. It seems that the defendant by consent or by a failure to
object may enlarge this rule. In People v. Mahoney,219 the jury
having requested that a coat alleged to have been worn by the
deceased at the time of the killing be sent to the jury room for
their inspection, defendant's counsel stated that the coat had
not formally been offered in evidence, and the court said that
under the circumstances, the jury would have to do without it;
counsel for defendant thereupon in open court consented that
=lHolton v. State,
IDixon v. State,
(1879).

2

13

Fla. 476 (1849).
Fla. 636 (1870); Coleman v. State,

17

Fla. 2o6

"'Green- v. State, 143 Ala. 2 (19o4); State v. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 613
(i88o); Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328 (1875).
'"Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328 (1875); State v. Webster, 21 Wash. 63
(I899) ; State v. Gillick, io Ia. 97 (I859); State v. Butterfield, 75 Mo. 297
(1882); Cook v. State, 231 Ill. 9 (1907); People v. Cochran, 6i Cal. 548
(1882).

Cf. State v. Raymond, 53 N. J. L. 260 (i8gi).
v. State, 7 Baxt. 387 (Tenn. 1874) ; see also State v. Thompson,

'Duncan

83 Mo. 257 (1884).

=' 77 Cal. 529 (1888).
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the coat be submitted to the jury. It was held that this consent
was a waiver of all objection. It has also been held that a failure to object to the jury's receiving something not within 22the
0
usual rule amounts to a waiver of the right to object thereto.
A question that frequently arises is this: If the jury without permission of the court* secure possession of the charge, of
an exhibit received in evidence, or of something not received in
evidence, what shall be the effect of such misconduct? If it
clearly appear that the defendant was not prejudiced, it is quite
generally held that the verdict will not be disturbed.2 21 There is
a difference of opinion in cases where the absence of prejudice
does not clearly appear. In some jurisdictions, it is held that the
burden is upon the prosecution to show that the defendant was
not prejudiced. In Ogden v. United States222 the indictments
were handed to the jury by an officer of the court and taken into
the jury-room with other papers for their consideration; on the
back of each was the indorsement of the finding of the jury in
the former trial, as set out in the record, that the defendant was
guilty; this was alleged as ground for a new trial. The court
held:

.;

,m

"We do not think it necessary for the defendant to show
that such indorsements had been read by the jurors or any of
them. The presumption that their presence in the jury-room,
under the circumstances, was injurious to the defendant, remains
until rebutted on the part of the plaintiff."
The other view is that a new trial will not be granted unless the
defendant shows affirmatively that he was prejudiced by the conduct of the jury.

So in State v. Harris,22 a the court held that

when the jury retired to deliberate, and improperly took out with
them a paper, there was no ground for a new trial, unless it
n'Howard v. People, 27 Col. 396 (19oo); State v. Taylor, 36 Kan. 329
(1887).
2"People v. Gaffney, 14 Abb. Prac. N. S. 36 (N. Y. 1872); Lovett v.
State, 6o Ga. 257 (1878); State v. Wilson, 4o La. An. 75, (1888); Common-

wealth v. Nash, 135 Mass. 541 (1883); Hendricks v. State, 28 Tex. Cr. 416
(I890).
= 112 Fed. Rep. 522 (I9o2) ; see also State v. Lantz, 23 Kan. 728 (i88o).
=34 La. An. 118 (1882). Accord: Spencer v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 238
(1895). And see People v. Priori, 164 N. Y. 459 (19oo).
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appeared that the paper was examined and that the accused was
prejudiced thereby. It is believed that the burden should be
upon the defendant to show prejudice in such cases.
X.

SEPARATION AND MISCONDUCT OF JURY.

At common law in the trial of felonies, the jury were not
permitted to separate from the time they were sworn until a
verdict was rendered; in the trial of misdemeanors, the court in
its discretion might permit the jury to separate at any time before verdict- Jurors were then more ignorant, subject to the
control of their superiors, and easily led astray. They had but
faint notions of popular rights and submitted to restrictions
that would not now be tolerated. Trials were brief, seldom
occupying an entire day. In Stephens v. People2 24 the court
said:
"The case under consideration occupied seventeen days. To
deprive jurors of all association with their families, to seclude
them from society, to interrupt their attention to their ordinary
affairs, and to deprive them of the opportunity to take such
exercise as may be, and often is necessary for the preservation
of their health, for so long a period is intolerably oppressive,
and can be justified only by absolute necessity. The men of
extensive business will not, the infirm cannot submit to the
confinement. The consequences are that if the ancient rules
forbidding the separation of jurors during a trial should be
enforced, at the present day, the public would lose the services
of the most reliable jurors and a weary burden would fall exclusively upon those who are unable to pay their fines, and to whom
and whose families the entire loss of time is a serious evil."
So with changing conditions there has been a relaxation of the
old rule and even in England it has been abrogated to the extent
indicated by an Act of 1897:225
"Upon the trial of any person for a felony other than murder, treason, or treason felony, the court may, if it see fit, at any
time before the jury consider their verdict, permit the jury to
separate, in the same way as the jury upon the trial of any person
for misdemeanor are now permitted to separate."
ig N. Y. 549 (1859).
6o & 6i Vict., Chap. i8.

77A

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

In this country the courts formerly applied the common
law rule very strictly, sometimes because required to do so by
statute. A separation was permitted in the trial of misdemeanors
at any time before verdict,2 26 but no separation was allowed during the trial in felony cases, 227 especially during the trial of capital felonies.2 28 The present statutory rule in West Virginia
appears to be that the jury are not permitted to separate in felony cases from the time they are sworn until they agree upon a
verdict or are discharged by the court,22 9 and in several States no
separation is permitted in capital cases, though in the trial of
felonies not capital the court may permit the jury to separate at
any time before they enter upon their deliberations. 23 0 In the
cases it has been pointed out that where separation is not permissible the fact that the defendant consented to it is entirely immaterial; it has been said that the defendant was not in a situation to exercise a fair choice, for he must run the risk of improper influences reaching the minds of the jurors, if he consents,
or of prejudicing them against him if he refuses. 2 31 Pfeiffer v.
Commonwealth 23 2 justifies the common law rule as follows:
"It is not too much to say that if it were abolished few influential culprits would be convicted and that few friendless ones,
pursued by powerful prosecutors, would escape -.onviction.
jurors are as open to prejudice from persuasion as other men,
and neither convenience nor economy ought to be consulted in
order to guard them against it. Let them have every comfort
compatible with their duties, but let them not be exposed to the
influence of those who might pervert their judgment."
2"Kruger v. State, i Neb. 465 (i866); Prewitt v. State, 65 Miss. 437
(z888).
='Wiley v. State, i Swan, 256 (Tenn. 1851); Cantwell v. State, I8 Ohio
St. 477 (i86).
SState v. Bonwell et aL, 2 Har. 529 (Del. 1811); Woods v. State, 43
Miss. 364 (1871) ; People v. Shaver, i Utah, 26o (1875).
"West Virginia, Code of igo6, §4571.
'E. g. Idaho, Revised Codes, i9o8, Vol. II, §7880; Kentucky, Crim. Code,
§244; Missouri, Ann. Stats., i9o6, §2628 (but in Missouri in cases not capital,
the separation may be permitted only with the consent of the prosecuting
attorney and the defendant).
'People v. Shaffer, I Utah, 26o (1875); Peiffer v. Commonwealth, 15
Pa. 468 (185o).

= 15 Pa. 468 (i85o).
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It is suggested that these reasons be compared with those just
quoted from Stephens v. People, in determining whether or not
it is advisable to permit the jury to separate during trial.
The tendency of modern decisions and statutes has been
toward a relaxation of the old rule, and now in many jurisdictions the court may permit the jury to separate at any time during the trial and before final submission of the cause to the jury,
both in the trial of felonies not capital, 233 and in the trial of cap-

ital felonies, 2 34 especially where no objection is made to the separation.2 35 As the whole matter is one within the discretion of
the trial court, it is not error for the court to direct that the
jurors be kept together, and the exercise of this discretion will
23
not be reviewed on appeal, unless it has clearly been abused. 0
Where there are statutes on this subject, it is usual to provide
that the court may permit a separation during trial without distinction as to the grade of the offense.2 37

So Section

1121

of

the California Penal Code provides:
"The jurors sworn to try an action may, at any time before
the submission of the cause to the jury, in the discretion of the
court be permitted to separate, or be kept in charge of a proper
officer. The officer must be sworn to keep the jurors together
until the next meeting of the court, to suffer no person to speak
to them or communicate with them, nor to do so himself, on any
subject connected with the trial, and to return them into court
at the next meeting thereof."
It is quite usual to require an oath of the officer in charge
of the jury, when they are not permitted to separate, such as is
provided for by the section of the California code just noted.
It has been held that if the jury be kept in the custody of an in'People
v. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134 (1898); Daxenbeklar v. People, 93
Ill. Ap. 553 (1goo); Territory v. Chenowith, 3 N. M. 225 (1885); Robbins
v. State, 49 Ala. 394 (1873).

=Bergin v. State, 31 Ohio St. 111 (1876); State v. Shaffer, 23 Ore. 555

(1893); State v. Nelson, 91 Minn. 143 (19o3).

State v. Andre, 14 S. D. 215 (igoo) ; Armstrong v. State, 2 Okla. Cr.

'

567 (9o9).

Commonwealth v. Lemon, 44 Pa. Super. Ct 538 (IgIo).
g. Cal. Penal Code, 1909, §1121; New York Code, Criminal Procedure, §414; Michigan, Howell's Stats., 1913, Vol. 5, §15131; Montana, Revised
Codes, 19o7, §9300; Nevada, Revised Codes, 1912, §7190.
"nE.
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dividual who is neither a sworn officer of the court, nor a person specially sworn to discharge this duty, a new trial must be
granted.238 This does not got too far, as it is but reasonable to
require that the care of a jury be entrusted only to one who has
taken an oath to do his duty in general or to attend to this particular duty. But it has also been held that even though the jury
be kept in charge of a sworn officer of the court, as a deputy
sheriff, yet a failure to administer the special oath of the statute
is error.239 A better rule, and one upheld by some of the courts,
is that while it is advisable to administer to the officer in charge
of the jury a special oath to discharge his duty, yet a failure to do
so is not error, where he is a sworn officer of the court. 240 Under
statutes providing that the special oath must be administered,
the courts are not perhaps free so to hold; a statute expressly
providing that the special oath should be administered, but that
its omission would not be error where a sworn officer of the
court has been entrusted with the jury, would be a complete solution of this question.
In many States, by statute, the jury must, at each adjournment of the court, whether permitted to separate or kept in
charge of officers, be admonished by the court that it is their.
duty not to converse among themselves, or with anyone else on
any subject connected with the trial, or to form or express any
241
opinion thereon, until the cause is finally submitted to them.
It has been held error for the court to fail to give the statutory
admonition. 24 2 but it has also been held that when it has once
been given, the failure to give the admonition during a subsequent short recess of the court was immaterial

error, 243 and

McCann v. State, 9 S. & M. 465 (Miss.).
Sutherland v. State, 76 Ark. 487 (1o95); Gibbons v. People,
(s86o).
'-Wilhelm v. People,
(1893).
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23

Ill. 518

Ill. 468 (1874); State v. Grafton, 89 Ia.iog

10E. g. Cal. Penal Code, 1909, §1122; Idaho, Revised Codes, i9o8, Vol. 2,
§7881; Indiana, Ann. Stats., 19o8, §2139; Iowa, Code, 1897, §5383; Kansas, General Stats., 19o5, §6126; New York Code, Criminal Procedure, 1913, §415.
21 Johnson v. State, 66 Ark. 401 (goo) ; People v. Thompson, 84 Cal. 6o6
(i8go).
' State v. Stackhouse, 24 Kan. 445 (i88o).
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that the failure of the defendant to object to its omission was a
waiver. 2 4" In the absence of a statute requiring it, the failure of
the court to admonish the jury at an adjournment is not error. 245
It is believed that the admonition, like the special oath above
discussed, should be given, but that a failure to do so should not
be ground for a new trial. Where the record is silent upon this
subject, it has been held both that the admonition would be presumed to have been given,2 6 and that it would not.2 4 7 A statute

providing that a failure to admonish the jury would not be
ground for reversal, would render impossible any such difference of opinion; if an entire failure to admonish the jury were
not ground for reversal, the mere silence of the record upon the
question could not be.
We have pointed out that at common law the jury were
not permitted to separate in the trial of felonies, from the time
they were sworn until verdict or discharge of the jury. We have
also noted the rather general relaxation of the rule in favor of
permitting the court to allow a separation during the trial, and at
any time before the final submission of the cause to the jury.
There has been no such relaxation in regard to separation of the
jury after the cause has been finally submitted to them. To be
sure, in Arkansas, 248 after the cause is submitted to the jury,
they must be kept together in charge of the sheriff, except during
their meals and periods for sleep, "unless permitted to separate
by order of the court," and in Wyoming 240 when the case is submitted to the jury and they retire for deliberation, they are required to be kept under the charge of an officer, "subject to the
discretion of the court to permit them to separate temporarily
at night and at their meals." But these statutes are exceptional.
The general rule may be said to be that the court may not per"'Lee v. State, 78 Ark. 77 (19o6).

", Pritchett v. State, 92 Ga. 65 (1893).
.' Evans v. State, 7 Port. 271 (Ind. 1855).
" People v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253 (9o6)
730 (19o7).
Digest of Stats., §2373.
Comp. Stats., 1900, §4501.

; cf. People v. Ye Foo, 4 Cal. Ap.
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250
mit the jury to separate after final submission of the cause,
and the error is no less because the defendant consented to the
251
separation.
2 52
Upon this subject the California Penal Code provides:

"After hearing the charge, the jury may either decide in
court, or may retire for deliberation, if they do not agree without retiring, an officer must be sworn to keep them together in
some private and convenient place, and not to permit any person
to speak or to communicate with them, nor to do so himself,
unless by order of the court, or to ask them whether they have
agreed upon a verdict, and to return them into court, when they
have so agreed, or when ordered by the court."
The usual statutory rule is exactly like, or very similar to, the
section quoted. As to the oath administered to the officer, practically the same considerations apply that were suggested in connection with the special oath administered to the officer in charge
of the jury when kept together during the trial. It has been held
error for the jury to be entrusted during their deliberations to
the care of an unsworn person. 253 It has also been held error
for the court to fail to cause the special oath to be administered, 254 but the weight of authority is to the effect that if the
jury be given over to the care of a sworn officer of the court, the
failure to administer the special oath is not error. 255 This is as
it should be. To bring about this result in some jurisdictions it
would be necessary, because of existing decisions, to provide ex' Parker v. State, r8 Ohio St. 88 (0868); Chance v. State, 5 Okla. Cr.
z94 (19ri); People v. Hawley, ixr Cal. 78 (1896). Cf. State v. McNeil, 59

Kan. 599 (r898).

m Parker v. State, 18 Ohio St. 88 (1868) ; People v. Hawley, iii Cal. 78

(1896).

§1128.

See Idaho, Rev. Codes, i9o8, Vol. 2, §7887; Arizona, Rev. Stats.,

gor, ~§956; Utah, Comp. Stats., §4877; South Dakota, Comp. Laws,

rgo8, Vol. 2, Code Cr. Pro., §386; North Dakota, Revised Codes, 19o5,
§1oo27; New York, Code Criminal Pro., I913, §421; and similar statutes in
other states.
'Roberts

z839).

v. State, 72 Ga. 673 (1884); Hare v. State, 4 How. 187 (Miss.

1 Lewis v. State, 44 Ill. 452 (867);

C1896).

State v. McCormick, 57 Kan. 44o

v. Crafton, 89 Ia. 109 (1893); Clayton v. State, roo Ind. 2ox
'State
(i884) ; Cato v. State, 9 Fla. 163 (i86o); Davis v. State, I5 Ohio, 72 (1846).
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pressly that the failure to administer the special oath should not
be error under the circumstances mentioned.
As the court has in many States the power to permit the
jury to separate during trial, but has no authority to permit a
separation after final submission of the cause to the jury, it becomes necessary to know when the cause may be said to be finally
In
submitted. Here we encounter a difference of opinion.
256 after the charge, the court gave the jury a
State v. Parrant,
recess of five minutes, and they were allowed to go at large for
that period of time. Upon their return the sheriff was sworn
to take charge of them, and they retired under his charge. The
court held that the plain meaning of the statute was that, after
hearing the charge, the jury must, at once, do one of two things
specified: agree in court or retire for deliberation. All separation after the charge was given was contrary to the statute. On
the other hand, in State v. Ferre, 2 after the charge was given,
the jury were permitted to separate for the noon meal. Upon
their return immediately thereafter, the court's charge and
blank verdicts were given them, and they then retired for deliberation. It was held that a cause is finally submitted to the jury
within the meaning of the statute at such time as the court directs
the jury to enter upon its deliberations and not necessarily at the
conclusion of the charge of the court to the jury; this cause was
finally submitted at the hour of reassembling, not at the time of
separation. The latter view seems to be the more logical.
It is generally held that the separation of a juror from the
rest of the jury, in proper custody, and for a necessary and
proper purpose, is not ground for a new trial, whether such separation happen during the trial,258 or after the jury have entered
upon their deliberations.25 9 Indeed, in Texas, 2 60 in felony cases,
this is the only kind of separation that is permitted, a statute
Minn. 178 ('87o).
NY69 Ohio St. 52, (903).
'Moss v. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. 267 (884); State v. Dyer, i39 Mo.
199 (1897); Kee v. State, 28 Ark. 155 (1873) ; Neal v. State, 64 Ga. 272 (1879).
= Cooper v. State, Io Ind. 377 (1889); State v. Adams, 20 Kan. 311
(x878); State v. Bowman, 45 Ia. 418 (877).
'Crim. Stats., 1911, §7454. See McCampbell v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 607
(1897).
2i6
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providing that after the jury has been sworn and impanelled to
try any case of felony, they shall not be permitted to separate
until they have returned a verdict, unless by permission of the
court, with the consent of the attorney representing the State
and the defendant, and in charge of an officer.
Misconduct of the jury or of other persons toward them
may or may not, according to the circumstances, be ground for
a new trial. The judge may be guilty of misconduct in improperly communicating with the jury, or in coercing them to a
verdict. In State v. Kiefer 6 1 while the jury were deliberating,
a written communication was sent to the court, signed by the
foreman, asking if the jury might recommend the defendant to
the mercy of the court. The judge indorsed upon the paper the
answer: "Yes, and I have made it an invariable rule to follow
such recommendations." A new trial was granted, the court
pointing out that "the jurors might very naturally conclude from
the language used, that they could rely upon the court to extend
clemency to the accused in case he should be convicted, and it
might have the effect to induce the jurors to disregard any reasonable doubts that they might have as to the guilt of the accused." Coercion of the jury by the court, regarded as ground
for a new trial, may be illustrated by the following cases. In
State v. Place,262 after the jury had been out all night without

having agreed, they were brought into court and asked if they
had agreed; they said not, that they were "shy on evidence". The
court then said: "But you will have to agree to this case, for I
will keep you together until you do agree." This was held
error. In People v. Sheldon,263 a capital case, the trial had
lasted seven weeks, and a verdict of guilty was rendered after
the jury had been kept together for about eighty-five hours without beds or cots, and from the remarks of the court they had
reason to believe that they would be still longer confined unless
they agreed; the court in refusing to discharge the jury on their
reporting their failure to agree had said: "I cannot hear of a
M i6 S. D. i8o (9o2) ; see also Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 262 (1859).
= o S. D. 489 (19o6).
30156 N. Y. 268 (1898) ; and see State v. Chambers, 9 Ida. 673 (i9o4).

CRITICISM ON CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE

disagreement of this jury; I would like to enforce upon you an
appreciation of the importance of settling this question-it has
got to be settled." The court held that the agreement of the
jury must be regarded as coerced, and as calling for a new
trial.
The court may, however, impress upon the jury the importance of their arriving at an agreement if they honestly can do so.
In Odette v. State, "

4

after the jury had been out some time and

failed to agree, they were brought into court and told by the
judge that "they ought not to stand out in an unruly and obstinate way, but should reason together and talk over the existing
differences, if any, and harmonize the same if possible; that it
was their duty to meet the testimony in a spirit of fairness and
candor with each other and not to stand back obstinately, but to
reason together and apply the law as given by the court to the
The
facts of the case, and arrive at some kind of a verdict."
that
the
a
threat
as
be
construed
court held that this could not
jury would not be discharged until they had agreed, and the
judgment was affirmed. Again, when a jury has difficulty in
arriving at a verdict, the time that it may be kept together is
largely a matter within the discretion of the court, and is not of
itself any evidence of coercion, unless the time is clearly unreasonable.2 65
Coercion of the jury or improper communications to them
on the part of the officer in charge may be ground for a new
trial. It has been held error for the officer to warn the jury that
they would be locked up for the night unless they agreed very
soon, or to read part of the instructions to the jury at their request, or to tell them to hurry up and agree upon a verdict, as
he was growing tired of being shut up with them, 266 but if a
M"go Wis. 258 (1895).
Accord: Secor v. State, 118 Wis. 671 (1903).
Contra: State v. Ivanhoe, 35 Ore. i5o (1899). See also Territory v. McGinnis,
io N. M. 269 (19oo); State v. Finch, 71 Kan. 793 (19o5); U. S. v. Ingham,
97 Fed. Rep. 935 (1899).
'Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 21 Ky. L Rep. 415 (1899) ; Russel v. State,
66 Neb. 497 (19o2) ; People v. Stock, i Ida. 218 (1868) ; State v. Rose, i42

Mo. 418 (I897).
"*Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193 (19o6); State v. Brown, 22 Kan. 222
(1879); Brown v. State, 69 Miss. 398 (i8gI). See also Coolman v. State,
163 Ind. 503 (i9o4) ; State v. Dallas, 35 La. An. 899 (1883) ; Shaw v. State,
79 Miss. 577 (9O).
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communication be shown not to have been of a character likely
to cause prejudice, a new trial will be refused. 267 The courts do
not agree as to whether the mere presence of the officer in the
jury room while they are deliberating upon their verdict is error.
It has been held that if the officer is a proper person to take
charge of a jury, it is not error that he was in the jury room
during the deliberations, 268 and on the other hand that his presence is error, because "whether he does or does not converse
with them, his presence to some extent must operate as a restraint
upon their proper freedom of action and expression.

'26 9

It is impossible to attempt to discuss within the limits of
this article all the forms of misconduct of which jurors have
been guilty, and the effect which has been given to such misconduct by the courts. A few, however, will be suggested as
illustrative of general principles on the subject. A new trial will
invariably be granted *where the verdict has been arrived at by

lot, 2 70 as where the jury have been unable to agree upon the

term of imprisonment, and, under an agreement to abide by the
result, have set down the number of years which each favored,
added the numbers so obtained, and divided the result by
twelve.2 7

1

It has been held error for the jury to obtain and

read, either during the trial or after retirement to deliberate upon
the verdict, newspapers containing imperfect or incorrect accounts of the trial or comments calculated to prejudice the defendant.27 2

Conversation of a juror with a third person has

'"State v. Barker, 43 Kan. 262 (i8 o); State v. Robertson, 5o La. An.
455 (1898) ; McFalls v. State, 66 Ark. z6 (x898); Alexander v. State, 22 So.
Rep. 871 (Miss. x898).
's Crockett v. State, 52 Wis. 211 (x88i) ; Martin v. State, 9 Tex. Ap. 293
(i88o) ; and see State v. Thompson, 54 N. W. Rep. 1077 (Ia. 1893) ; Gaines
v. People, 97. Ill. 270 (1881).
:"People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267 (1879); Gandy v. State, 24 Neb. 716
(1888); and see Longley v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 8o7 (I9oo).

'See e. g. California, Penal Code, §1181-3; Idaho, Revised Codes, 19o8,
VoL 2, §7952-3; Ia. Code, 1897, §5424-4; Montana, Rev. Codes, i9o7, §935o-4;
New York. Code Cr. Pro., §433-4.
nDrver v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 16o ('897); Williams v. State, i5Lea,
129 (Tenn. x885). Cf. Glidewell v. State, i5Lea, 133 (Tenn. 1885).
2Walker v. State, 37 Tex. 366 (1872); Cartwright v. State, 71 Miss.
But cf. State v. Jackson, 9
92 (1893); State v. Walton, 92 Ia. 455 (1894).
Mont. 5o8 (i89o); State v. Williams, 96 Minn. 351 (19o5); McCue v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 871 (9o5).
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been held ground for a new trial, but by the weight of authority,
a new trial will not be granted if it be shown that such conversation did not concern the case or for some other reason was not
prejudicial to the accused. 2T 3

In Hutchins v. State,27 4 after the

jury had retired, and one had been selected foreman, he refused
to allow any juryman to express an opinion or say anything of
the law or the evidence in the case, unless the juror so desiring
to express his opinion should first arise and address the foreman
as chairman, and be recognized by the chairman. The court
held this error, as men on the jury of the soundest judgment and
good sense, but unfamiliar with the rules of debate, and unaccustomed to rise and address the chairman of a meeting in a
formal manner, might be intimidated by such a rule as was here
enforced.
A common form of misconduct among jurors has been the
drinking of intoxicating liquor during the trial or while the jury
deliberate upon the verdict. If intoxication results, there is no
question but that a new trial will be granted. 275 Where intoxication does not result, there are different views in the States, as
to the effect of the misconduct. It has been held that the drinking of intoxicating liquor, at any rate while the jury are deliberating upon their verdict, is of itself error, without any inquiry
at all into the question whether the defendant was prejudiced
thereby. 278

So in State v. Baldy2

77

the court said:

"The parties have a clear right to the cool, dispassionate and
unbiased judgment of each juror applied to the determination
of the issues in the cause, and the use in any degree of that
which stimulates the passions and has a tendency to lessen the
soundness of judgment is itself conclusive evidence that the
party who has the right to the exercise of that dispassionate
-State v. Cotts, 49 W. Va. 6,5 (igoi); Riley v. State, 9 Humph. 646
(Tenn. 1849); Suple v. State, 133 Ga. 6oi (Igg); State v. Harris, 12 Nev.
414 (1877); State v. High, 1i6 La. An. 79 (i9o6); State v. Craig, 78 Ia.
641 (1889).
2'14o

Ind. 78 (1894).

" Brown v. State, 137 Ind. 240 (1893) ; People v. Gray, 61 Cal. 164 (1882).
2' State v. Bullard, 16 N. H. 139 (1844); People v. Chuck, 78 Cal. 317
(1889), but cf. People v. Bemmerly, cited note 81, infra; and see State v.
Strodemeir, 41 Wash. 159 (i9o5) ; People v. Myers, 7o Cal. 58? (1886).
" 17 Ia. 39 (1864).
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judgment, has been prejudiced in not having it as perfect as it
existed in the juror when accepted, applied to the determination
of the cause."
The tendency, however, is to determine the effect to be
given to drinking by the jurors upon a basis of prejudice to the
defendant. If it is shown that the defendant was not prejudiced, a new trial will be refused.2 7 8 If the absence of prejudice
is not shown, there is the difference of opinion that we have
already noted in other connections. It is held on the one hand
that the misconduct of the jury raises a presumption that the
prisoner was injured thereby, which the State must remove beyond a reasonable doubt,27 9 and on the other that the burden is
upon the defendant to show that he was prejudiced, and that
20
the verdict was affected by the misconduct alleged. 8
We have pointed out that in general the court may permit
the jury to separate at any time before the cause is finally submitted to them, and that no separation may be permitted after
final submission of the cause. We now inquire: If during the
trial, the court has required the jury to be kept together, and
they have separated without authority, or if they have separated after the cause has been submitted to them, what effect is to
be given to their misconduct in this particular? In some of the
cases, a new trial has been refused when asked, because there
28 1
had been in fact no separation at all. In State v. White,
during a recess of the court, a juryman left the jury box, walked
across the courtroom and took a drink of water from-a bucket in
another part of the room. The officer in charge of the jury
testified that the juryman was not out of his sight. A new trial
was held to have been properly refused under these circumstances. In Minor v. Commonwealth2 2 the jury were lodged

'"Gamble

v. State, 44 Fla. 429 (19o2) ; State v. Madigan, 59 h. W. Rep.

49o (Minn. 1894); Jones v. State, 6 Col. 452 (1882); State v. Reilly, io8 Ia.
635 (i899).
i State v. Greer, 2 W. Va. 8oo (1883).
People v. Bemmerly, 98 Cal. 299 (893) ; State v. Bruce, 48 Ia. 530
(1878); State v. Olberman, 33 Ore. 556 (1899); State v. Tatlow, 34 Kan.
8o (i885) ; Allen v. State, 17 Tex. Cr. 637 (i885).
m52 La. An. 2o6 (i899).
15 Ky. L. Rep. i76 (1883). Accord: Commonwealth v. Manfredi,
162 Pa. 144 (894).
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on the second floor of a hotel in different rooms along the same
hall, in which the sheriff locked them at night. This was held a
sufficient compliance with the statute requiring them to be kept
together.
Where there has been an unauthorized separation, we find
the rules applied not different from those suggested in connection with jurors indulging in intoxicating liquors. Where it is
reasonably certain that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
separation, a new trial will be refused. 28 3 For example, in Commonwealth v. McCauley,2 "4 after the jury had agreed upon a
verdict, and were returning to the courtroom, a juror, without
the knowledge of anyone, separated from his fellows and left the
courthouse to go to dinner. When his absence was discovered
the presiding justice instructed the officer in charge of the jury
to keep the other jurors together in the courtroom and to seek
the missing juror and bring him back. This having been done,
a verdict of guilty was rendered in the usual manner. The presiding justice afterwards talked with the juror and the officer
who went in search of him and was satisfied that the juror, during his absence, had not conversed with anyone in regard to the
case, and found that the separation did not prejudice the defendant. The court, on motion to set aside the verdict, held that the
facts were- not, as matter of law, inconsistent with the finding
of the presiding justice, and the defendant's exceptions were
overruled. If it is not perfectly clear that the prisoner has not
sustained any injury from the separation, there is a difference of
opinion as to its effect. In some jurisdictions it is held that the
defendant is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that the
irregularity has been prejudicial to him, and the burden of proof
is upon the government to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the prisoner has suffered no injury by reason of the separation.28 5 In others, it is held that the burden is upon the defendv. Harlow, 21 Mo. 446 (1855); Thompson v. Commonwealth,
"'State
8 Va. 837 (1851); State v. Church, 6 S. D. 89 (1894); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 209 Pa. 529 (19o4); State v. O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336 (1862); Terri-

tory v. Hart, 7 Mont. 489 (Y888).
2"

156 Mass. 49 (1892).

'"During

trial: State v. Prescott, 7 N. H. 287 (I834); Keenan v. State,
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ant to show that he has been .prejudiced, and in the absence of
such a showing, a new trial will not be granted. 28

The adop-

tion by legislation of a rule that no new trial should be granted
because of misconduct of the jury or of other persons toward
them, unless the accused show affirmatively that he was prejudiced, would prevent the reversal of many cases in jurisdictions where new trials are now granted because of the rule that
error is presumed, and the burden is upon the State to remove
the presumption.
Only a few phases of trial procedure have been considered
in the couirse of this discussion; the writer has endeavored, however, to "show that the examination of existing rules in regard
to almost any aspect of the subject will show the need of remedial
legislation. The adoption by the several States of a criminal
code, which will prevent the escape of a guilty defendant because of technicalities or irregularities not shown to be prejudicial to him, yet will give complete justice to all who are brought
to trial on criminal charges, is greatly to be desired.
Howard A. Lehman.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
8 Wis. 132 (1859) ; Thacker v. Commonwealth, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 745 (19O1);
State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729 (1892).
During deliberations: People v. Adams, 143 Cal. 2o8 (19o4); Boles v.
State, 13 S. & M. 398 (Miss. 185o) ; Weis v. State, 22 Ohio St. 486 (1872).
The state may of course remove the presumption by proof: State v.
Clark, 51 W. Va. 457 (19o2) ; People V. Cord, 157 Cal. 562 (1gio).

; State
l Adams v. People, 47 Ill. 376; State v. Wart, 51 Ia. 587 (879)
v. Olds, lo6 Ia. iio (1898); Cox v. State, 7 Tex. Ap. I (1879); State v.
Dougherty, 55 Mo. 69 (1874) ; Stout v. State, 76 Md. 317 (1892) ; Shivers v.
Ter., 13 Okla. 466 (9o).

